2 April 2013
Dear Transport for London,
It was stated for the public record at the July 7th Inquest that on
July 7th, 2005, Tfl control declared a system-wide "Code Amber"
across the London Underground, signalling a complete evacuation of
the network at 9.13 am.
Please could you confirm the running times and provide please the
service logs relating to all Southbound Northern Line services
confirmed as departing Kings Cross St Panceas after 8.30am which
were confirmed as arriving at Bank Station, prior to the Code Amber
condition going into effect?
Could you please also confirm the exact time at which Southbound
Northern line services calling at Bank were in fact suspended and
the evacuation procedure went into effect both at Bank Station
specifically and on the Southbound Northern line City branch
generally.
It is stated that Code Amber triggers the evacuation proceedure for
the Underground network -please could you confirm how Code Amber
typically impacts provision of service on the DLR, if at all, from
a policy point of view? How would a decision to extend the
suspension to the DLR be made and who would typically be
responsible for making it?
Are you also confirm, if possible, if the relevant officer or
post-holder did indeed make that executive decision, and at what
time?
A Tfl Travel Update issued at 12:35 pm states:
"12:35 Docklands Light Railway services are currently suspended.
This is precautionary measure"
Please could you provide a detailed breakdown and timeline of when
in fact this suspension went into effect and the circumstances
informing the executive decision to suspend DLR services across the
board , with reference to the key decision makers.
Please could you also supply copies of the service log, confirming
scheduled and actual arrival times for all Eastbound DLR services
normally scheduled to depart from Bank between 8.45 am and
confirmed as having arrived at Canary Wharf prior to the decision
to suspend the DLR.
If such are available, please could you also supply copies of any
incident reports relating to specific services or rolling stock,
station premesise, track or other TFL or DLR property, premesise
or assets on this stretch of line (Bank to Canary Wharf) within the
given timeframe (8.30 am to the time of network-wide suspension)
that potentially could have contributed to the decision to suspend
DLR services.
Additionally, a later Tfl Service Update published at 16:45 stated
:
"DLR
Full services have resumed following a Police sweep of the network.
But Bank, Stratford and Canning Town - where the DLR interchanges
with the Tube - will be closed."
Please could you confirm the nature, character and cause that
prompted this "sweep" and confirm in as much detail as is available
within the record from which specific Police Force (Metropolitan,
City or British Transport), which specific policing unit
(counterterrorism, community support, Commissioner's Office) and,
to the extent that the record indicates, who specifically was the
point of contact liasing with Tfl during this timeframe, either
advising or instructing the imposition and lifting of the
system-wide service suspension on the DLR, along with any and all
additional germaine facts or advice shared by these key decision
makers mitigating the respective decisions to first suspend, then
fully resume a substantially normal service at the relevant
junctures during the day's events.
I would also be grateful if you could clarify the basis for the
stark contrast apparently manifest in the evaluating the current
threat level estimate present across the Underground network and
the DLR network, namely any pertinent or germain information then
available supportive of the view that any security threat to the
DLR network was either negligible or non-existant and required no
further precautionary action, while the security and safety doubts
relative to the Underground remained both formidable and credible,
engendering the sense that some additional degree of caution be
exercised, something not considered to be a factor on the DLR when
lifting the suspension of service more promptly and decisively by
mid-afternoon.
Finally, I would be grateful if you could provide copies of all
daily maintainence logs submitted by the subcontractor relating to
both station platforms and in-service rolling stock units on the
Northern Line, City Branch, Kings Cross to Bank inclusive, and all
DLR premesises, property and Rolling stock units in-service and
operating between the Bank interchange and Canary Wharf incluisive,
relating to the whole 24 period of July 7th 2005
Yours faithfully,
(And with apologies and thanks in advance, yours very gratefully)
Mr. Paul Coker
From: FOI
Transport for London
3 April 2013
Dear Mr Coker
TfL Ref: FOI-0019-1213
Thank you for your email received by Transport for London (TfL) on 2 April
2013 asking for information about the events of 7 July 2005.
Your request will be processed in accordance with the requirements of the
Freedom of Information Act and TfL’s information access policy.
A response will be provided to you by 30 April.
In the meantime, if you would like to discuss this matter further, please
do not hesitate to contact me.
Yours sincerely
Lee Hill
FOI Case Officer
FOI Case Management Team
General Counsel
Transport for London
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